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Notes and Comments
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
As modem research in the fields of psychology and psychiatry
continues to broaden the understanding of mental disorders it becomes
increasingly apparent that the law is lagging far behind in its understanding of and tests for msanity as a defense in criminal law
The early development of the law relating to insanity shows a
tendency to confuse sub-standard intelligence or feeble mindedness'
with msanity, an oversimplification from which the law has not yet
been able to extricate itself. Today learned members of the psychiatric fields are expected to aid in the determination of insanity when
the legal tests are so immature and misleading as to defy the application of modem principles.
Before the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), the kings pardon was
necessary to excuse a madman from criminal responsibility 2 Both before and after that time the various definitions of a madman termed
hm- a brute or wild beast,3 a child less than 14,4 or one unable to
number twenty pence. 5 All of these tests indicate immaturity or
feebleness of mind as much as or more than insanity as it is scientifically understood."
'See VAUCHN, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 570-573 (11th Rev. Ed. 1939), for a
description, origins, and types.
3 HOLDSWORTH, HISroRY OF ENGLISH LAW 372 (1923); 2 POLLOCK AND
MAITLAND 478 (1911); 2 STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF Tim CmnmNAL LAw OF ENGLAND
151 (1883). "About five hundred years ago it was not uncommon for a 'lunatic
to be considered as possessed of evil spirits and therefore ipso facto cnminal.
They were frequently incarcerated in ill kept prisons where the so-called supervision was notonously cruel, and it was only in the most extreme cases that a
defense of insanity could hope to succeed." MEaurrE,
DEFENSE 7 (1931).

INsANrrY

AS A

CimHNAL

"A madman
is one who does not kmow what he is doing, who lacks
in mind and reason
and who is not far removed from the brutes." This was
an early definition by Bracton as quoted by GLuEcE, MENTAL DIsoRDa AND THE
CrmnmN
LAw 126 (1925).
See the discussion of the "wild beast" test in Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Fr. 695, 764 (1724), reprinted, SAYRE, CASES ON CRIuIINAL LA-,w 483 (1927).
See also MEREDITH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
'If "such a person laboring under melancholy distempers bath yet ordinarily
as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of 14 hath," he may be guilty of
treason or felony.

HALE, PLEAS

OF THE

CROWN 30 (Ed. of 1778).

Early m the sixteenth century, Fitzherbert would excuse "a person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his mother or father,
nor how old he is, etc., so as it may well appear he bath no understanding or
reason what shall be for his profit, or what for his loss." Cited In 1 HAwKjNs,
PLEAS OF THE CRowN 2 (8th ed. 1824).
"Today m courts of cnmmal jurisdiction, the defense of insanity is so frequent, and of such wide range, as to include, the raving mamac, the epileptic,
tHe man whose act is committed under what is called an 'irresistible impulse, and
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Of course, neither a child who is beneath the age of understanding
nor a feeble-minded adult should be held accountable for a crime.
Such persons are irresponsible and should be excused.7 However,
insanity is an infinitely broader field s and deserves a test far superior
to that laid down in McNaughton s Case," the legal test of insanity in
the majority of jurisdictions today 10 The McNaughton rules state
that one is excused who does not know the nature and quality of the
crimmal act or, if he does, he does not know that it is wrong. This
theory stems from the early tests of insanity concerning those "not far
removed from the brutes." Glueck points out that the first half of
the McNaughton test is based on the theory that a madman or brute
"does not know what he is doing.""i
The second half of the test, that of right and wrong, also shows its
origin to be interrelated with the comprehension of children and
idiots 12 of the abstract terms of good and evil. 13 Although the term
"good and evil" came to be used synonymously with the phrase "right
and wrong" in several early 19th Century cases, it was not until the
opinion m McNaughtons Case that "knowledge of right and wrong
as to the particular act was substituted as a criterion for 4the knowledge
of right and wrong or good and evil m the abstract."1
The rules laid down m 1843 by the justices in McNaughton s Case
even a condition which I have seen vaguely, if not elegantly, described as a
'brainstorm " MEREDrrH, op. cit. supra note 2 at v. (Greenshields forward).
"Unsoundness of mind is no longer regarded as in essence a disorder of the intellectual or cognitive faculties. The modem view is that it is something much
more profoundly related to the whole orgamnsm-a morbid change in the emotional
and instinctive activities with or without intellectual derangement" Id. at 113.
"'The feeble-minded
constitute a grave social problem, since they turn
so readily to crime if the proper safeguards are not taken in their training.
Since hereditary types of the feeble-minded tend to propogate their own land,
and since they tend to multiply rapidly, eugeincists have suggested segregation,
coloinzation, and sterilization as remedial measures." VAUCHAN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 572.
8 MERnFiTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at ix (preface).
"It has been said that
one in every three hundred persons is 'insane in one way or another and that
the civilized world is full of men and women who are warped' and in whom a
varying degree of mental unsoundness exists."
010 Clark and F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1848).
101 BuoicK, LAw OF Cnrms 277 (1946); GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 3,

at 214. See SAYRE, CASES ON CmiinNAL LAW 487 n. 1 (1927).
" Op. cit. supra note 3, at 127.
2An idiot belongs to the lowest class of feeble-mindedness.

See VAUGHAN,
op. cit." supra note 1, at 572.
those who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between
good and evil, as infants under the age of discretion, idiots, and lunatics, are not
puishable by any criminal prosecution
" HAWKINS, Op. cit. supra note 5,
at 1-2.
"IWEmOFEN, INsANiTY AS A DEFENSE IN CRuINAL LA,
20 (1938). See
GLUECK S excellent case study of American jurisdictions employing the Right and
Wrong test, op. cit. supra note 8, at 227 et seq. See also MEREDITH, Op. cit. supra
note 2, at 24.
[
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have been the subject of numerous and varied criticisms. First of
all it is pointed out that the rules were laid down extra-judicially, i.e.,
they were simply the replies of judges to certain questions put to them
not during but after McNaughton s Case.15 They were not based
on any one case and the judges were obliged to lay down the law
without hearing evidence or argument of counsel. It was on this
point that Justice Maule, the lone dissenter among the 15 judges, took
issue with his colleagues.", This objection seems valid when it is
considered that the judges had to draw only from contemporary
theories and past precedents which were tainted with the barbarism
of the wild beast test and the naive 14-year-old test.17 One group of
authorities points out that the opinion of the judges was indefinite
because after setting forth the questions that should be submitted
to a jury they added that the questions should be "accompanied with
such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require." This, it is claimed, "left the door open
for modification" and showed that the judges had but "halting faith
in the efficacy, clearness and all-mclusiveness of their own tests."is

Of course, a clear and simple test must be put to a jury composed
of laymen who know nothing of the scientific tests of insanity, in
order that they may use their own knowledge and the facts of the
case to frame a yes or no answer. This limitation in our present system of determining insanity forces the use of an oversimplified test.
Dr. William White recommended that the jury s function should be
confined merely to deciding whether or not the crime charged had
been committed. If it had, then the prisoner should be turned over
to the state authorities who would determine the question of insanity
by employing medical experts; the jury would have nothing to do
with deciding whether the prisoner was insane. 10 Other medical
authorities maintain that the determination of sanity should rest with
the jury but that the panel, instead of consisting of laymen, should be
' MEREDrrH,

" Ibid.

op. cit. supra note 2, at 29.

""Surely no two states of mind can be more unlike than that of a healthy

boy of fourteen, and that of a man 'labonng under melancholy distempers "
STEPirEN, HisTony OF TIE CmIInNAL LAW OF ENGLAND

150 (1883).

2

And see

State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. L. 145, 112 Atl. 400, 402 (1920). It is argued that
this test would be useful as a gauge of feeble-mindedness rather than insanity.

See Woodbndge, Some Unusual Aspects of Mental Irresponsibilityin the Criminal
Law, 29 JotRNAL OF CRInMNAL LAW AND CIMNNOLOGY 822, 827 (1939). And
see VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 569-573 for a discussion of intelligence
tests and feeble-mndedness.

op. cit. supra note 3, at 427.
LAW (1923) as quoted by
supra note 2, at 115.
"CGLUEcK,

" INsANiTY AND TRE CRIMInNAL

MEREDrrH,

op. cit.
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made up of "tramed alienists or brain specialists. ' 20 However, such
approaches as these have heretofore been held unconstitutional as de21
priving the defendant of trial by jury
It is clear, nevertheless, that whatever action is taken m connection with the mechanical method by which the law determines msanity a closer union of law and science is necessary if we are to
progress toward a reasonable solution to the problem. This is pointed
up by the gross inadequacies of the McNaughton Rules in connection
with such problems as insane delusions and irresistibleimpulse.
McNaughtons Case was actually based on an insane delusion.2 2
The defendant was under the impression resulting from mental disorder that Prme Minister Sir Robert Peel was plotting against him,
23
probably a condition of persecutory paranoia,
not well known at
the time. Consequently, by mistake, he killed one Drummond with
a pistol. He was found "Not guilty, on the ground of nmanity" General dissatisfaction over this case led the House of Lords to pose the
questions concerning insanity that the judges answered in giving
us the so-called McNaughton rules. Questions one and four dealt
with the problem as to the criminal responsibility of one laboring
under an insane delusion. In essence the judges replied that one
who commits an offense m consequence of the insane delusion is in
the same position as to responsibility as if the facts m respect to which
the delusion exists were real. Some nine American jurisdictions have
adopted this test.24 The rest apparently take the view that despite
their inconsistencies, all four questions are to be taken together, rather
than separately, and that the general right and wrong test is to prevail
25
in the case of insane delusion.
Both of these views appear to be weak. The first presupposes
that the subject is always sane in every respect except for the delusion, a circumstance which is not always the case, and the second
merely reverts to the ordinary test of insanity, the fault of which
has already been discussed. The discoveries of medical science have
revealed such an intricate pattern of paranoiac and other delusional
- Mmimrru, op. cit. supra note 2, at 115.

1 Insanity is held to preclude the necessary criminal element of mens rea
which along with the act, must be determined by a jury. Note, 32 COL. L. Rtv.

952, 953 (1932).

' Supra note 9.
'See VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 488. "It is true indeed that sometimes there are adequate grounds for suspicion but in many instances slight evidence is accepted as damning proof. Innocent remarks may be converted into
malicious insults."

See also FOWERBAUGH,

PSYCHO-CLINICAL

STUDIES IN THE

PA ANOID PSYCHOSES 3 (1930). And see KnAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHA SEXUALIS
495-497 (Robinson ed. 1945).
SWE.IHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 75.
21
Id., at 69.
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psychoses that any such tests as these are absurdly primitive. The
field is still young and growmg 20' and is one to be perused by medical
experts rather than an uninformed jury attempting to apply antiquated tests.
It appears that a victim may be suffering from paranoiac de27
lusions and be perfectly sane and sensible in all other respects.
But, of course, insane delusions are the result of deep rooted disorders affecting the entire psychological and emotional structure2
29
and there seems to be an endless variety of types.
Ultimately the law of insane delusion may follow the pattern of
homicide under provocation where mental condition may be a factor
in mitigating the gravity of the offense.30 In some instances, naturally,
FowERBAUGH, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3.
B'
BLUELER,
TxrnooK oF INsANITY 509 (1924), expresses the view that the
patient is sound outside of his delusional system and everything that refers to it.
MERIrTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12, states that delusioned insanity, often called

monomama, may cause a patient to suffer from insane delusions though in many
respects he may be perfectly normal.
It is pointed out by the psychiatrists who attended the German leader
Rudolph Hess during is captivity that his paranoid psychosis of the subject of
Nazism and Hitlensm was of such force that during the periods of amnesia his
only basic recollections were of God and Hider. See REES, THE CASE OF RUDOLPH
HESS 142, 195 et. seq. (1938). "
privately such men can be charming and
as soon as the conversation turns to politics their speech and
cultivated, but
thought suddenly breathes an arctic chill
these might seem to be victims of
a peculiar disease. Even a man of such ugh intellectual and artistic endowments
as Frederick the Great gave proof in the sphere of international politics of what
was little short of moral insanity. " Id. at 201.
op. cit. supra note 2, at 113.
- MEREDrr,
' VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 487, mentions the prominence of delusions ofjealousy. "A man suspected his wife of infidelity because, when he
rushed in the house unexpectedly one day, she looked surprised and startled; when
he called her on the phone, the line was busy- when he announced he was going
away on a trip, she seemed delighted at the prospect." BEERS, A MNm THAT
FOUND ITSELF 72 (1932) describes the authors feeling of having committed
imaginary crimes and consequent fear of punishment. When his brother said,
"You are looking better, and getting stronger, we shall straighten you out yet,"
he immediately thought he meant thus electrocution or hanging and to be straightened out, in the horizontal posture, to eternity. Suppose this jealous husband or
terrified brother commits murder, shall he be excused? FOWERBAUGH, op. cit.
supra note 2.3, at 6, lists the case histories of sufferers of various paranoiac disorders. For a general discussion of the problem, see id. at 3 et. seq. Attention
is directed to such matters as basic personality changes, genetic factors, presence
or absence of hallucination, psycho-dynamics of paranoia, the rationalization processes in syntome paranoia, schizophreme paranoid rationalization, etc. See
FREUD, Tir BASle VnrrMos oF SisGIrtm FREUD 495 (Brill translation, 1938) for
a discussion of hallucinatory paranoiac conditions and case histories. And see
MERmDm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27.

Rex v. Manchueh, 4 D. L. R. 737 (1937) where provocation was held to
reduce murder to manslaughter. See also Regina v. Chapman, 12 Cox C. C. 4
(1872); State v. Yang, 74 Conn. 177, 50 At]. 37 (1901); Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev.
928 (1938); and note, 18 Cornell L. Q. 376-390 (1933). GLUECK, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 374, suggests a concept of limited responsibility in the case of a lucid
interval, in wich an insane man becomes momentarily sane and during the period
commits a crime.
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insane delusion will serve as a complete excuse to the crime, dependmg on the circumstances and the mental condition of the patient.
If the law, in its recognition of the frailties of human nature, will
allow the heat of passion resulting from sudden combat or seeing
one s wife in adultery to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter,
it may be argued that it is just as reasonable to create degrees of responsibility and opportunities for mitigation where an offender is
laboring under an insane delusion. The widespread variations of the
condition and the ever increasing number of individuals being
diagnosed as paranoids 31 together with the present inadequate tests
cry out for reform.
Another problem in connection with the McNaughton rules is
that of irresistible impulse. The "right and wrong" test laid down
therein does not purport to cover this field. 32 However, approximately seventeen states and the District of Columbia add irresistible
impulse to the test for insanity 33 Irresistible impulse has been defined as where the actor knew the nature and quality of the act and
knew that it was wrong, but was nevertheless uncontrollably impelled
to commit it. 34

The majority of jurisdictions reject irresistible impulse either be-

cause it is felt that it does not exist 35 or that the proof is too difficult.30
It is submitted that neither of these objections is valid: not only does
medical science establish its existence 3 T but a suitable system could
provide for the administration of proof.
Menninger, Paranoid Psychoses, 51 JOURNAL OF MENTAL AN NERVOUS,
87 (1920). °
In Reg. v. Barton, 8 Cox. C. C. 275 (1848) the judge remarked, "The excuse of an irresistible impulse, co-emsting with the full possession of the reasoning
powers nught be urged in justification of every crme known to the law-for every
man might be said, and truly, not to commit any crime except under the influence
of some irresistible impulse." WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15.
"WEMOFEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 16, lists the following states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Vermont, Virgima, and
Wyoming. Of these, he states Louisiana, Massachusetts, and New Mexcao are
doubtful. He further states, "The U. S. Supreme Court also seems to have adopted
the irresistible impulse test." See also GLUECK, op. Cit. supra note 8, at 267, for
a list of jurisdictions employing the test and analysis of cases.
at ,,
he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,
and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time
" Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 -- 2 So. 854, 866 (1887).
destroyed
It is contended that irresistible impulse is only unresisted impulse. Note 84
MIcH. L. REv. 569, 570 (1936). See GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 235.

3See

GooDnIn~T, EssAYs

ON

JURISPRUDENCE

AND THE COMMON LAw

47

(1981). And see MEREDrrH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61 et. seq.
"In contending that a person may by some irresistible impulse be compelled
to some action, the nature of which he knows and knows to be wrong, medical
authorities, after pointing out that insanity more frequently attacks a person s
Will and Emotions than his intellectual power, claim that a conative force of
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Several types of irresistible impulse exist. The phrase has been
applied to "ldeptomania"-an irresistible impulse to steal, "pyromania"
-an irresistible inpulse to set fires, and "homicidal mania-an irresistible impulse to kill.38 To be added to this list is the so-called sex
crime which is an increasingly severe and vexing problem for the
courts.30 There is a body of opinion holding that the sex crime is
only an unresisted impulse.40 The logic here is the ordinary sexual
desires may be resisted and rape by an otherwise normal man is
punishible. However, Krafft-Ebing points out, "When the sexual
instinct is perverse (states of psychical degeneration), it may, at the
same time, be so intensified as to be irresistible."
Thus he concludes,
"For various reasons the practical jurist will in all cases of sexual
42
crimes, call medical experts to make a psychiatric exammation."
43
The problem of "deptomania," often not recognized by the courts,
and usually mvolvmg the taking of things for which the irresistibly
impelled thief has not the slightest use, 44 may also involve a sexual
aspect. Havelock Ellis4 5 mentions the existence of "erotic deptomania" or more properly called "Ideptolagnia" where the thief takes
worthless objects (often a piece of silk or other stuff which could be,
as the subject already knew, used to secure sexual excitement). This
is an extension of the well-known sexual deviation called fetichism
in which the sexual drive is diverted from the opposite sex and finds
its gratification in some article of clothing or other object. 46 Evenuainsanity (affecting the will. and emotions) may exist alongside an unimpaired
intellect. Thus a good and sane intellect may be entirely governed by a corrupted
and insane will. For this reason it is urged that the McNaughton rules, in treatmg insanity as a matter of intelligence and not of will, are inadequate and should
be changed in the light of modem medical opimon." MEREDITH, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 112.
GLurEcic, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 304.
" Criminal statistics prove the sad fact that sexual crimes are progressively
increasing in our modem civilization." KRAFFr-EBRINC, op. cit. supra, note 23, at
498. "In no domain of criminal law is cooperation of judge and medical expert
so much to be desired as in that of sexual delinquencies; and here only anthropological and clinical investigation can afford light and knowledge." Id. at 501.
"'See MfEREDITH, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 65.
O. cit. supra, note 18, at 503.
42-la. at 503.
"See, State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W 638, 640 (1935). "When
a morbid m-pulse is brought forward in court as a defense for theft it is too easy
for the magistrate to retort: 'That is what I am here to cure. " ELLIS, PSYCHOLOGY
OF SEX 18.3 (2d ed. 1946).
"See Kenny, Outlines of the Criminal Law 57 (12th ed. 1926). Such articles as umbrellas or straw hats are often the subject of kleptomania.

'SOp. cit. supra, note 46, at 183-185.

'See KRAFFr-EBING, op. cit. supra, note 23, at 218-282. The author deals
with case histories involving sexual attraction to numerous articles of female clothing, furs, velvet, roses, and animals. He gives a case history ontpage 255 of a
mania for women s handkerchiefs and a resulting series of thefts thereof.
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ally, he points out, the very act of theft itself may result in sexual
satisfaction.

47

Ellis mentions the existence of "pyrolagnia," a rare condition of
"erotic pyromania" in which the offender derives sexual satisfaction
from setting fires.48 In addition, the existence of "necrophilia" where
corpses are the object of sexual desire and the frequent cases of
murder by those subject to the condition 49 lead to the conclusion that
homicidal mania," too, can be associated with sex.50 In all of these
instances there may be only unresisted impulse but we must bear in
mind Krafft-Ebmgs statement that perverted sexual drives may result in irresistible impulse to gratify them.5 '
Not only can the existence of irresistible impulse be effectively
demonstrated by the research of medical science in the field of sexual
crimes, but also in the field of pharmacopsychoses, or mental disorders due to drugs or alcohol, where unreststed impulse may become
52
irresistible.
Meredith points out the drunkenness itself is no excuse since "the
law will not allow one wrong act to be an excuse for another," but it
can be taken into consideration as affecting the mens rea and may serve
as a mitigation.5 3 Then, too, the existence of drunkenness may preclude conviction on the grounds that the specific intent necessary to
54
constitute the crime is by reason thereof absent.
A much more difficult problem arises where the indulgence in alcohol or narcotics leads to mental illnesses. The law has been
tragically inept in its handling of these cases. The disorder may
exist in the form of pathological states of inebriety; 5 delirium tre-

I ELLIS, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 184. See also KRAFF-r-EBING, op. Cit.
supra, note 18, at 543.
" ELLIS, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 183.
" See KRAFFr-EBING, op. cit. supra, note 23, at 99-105 for case histories.
"This horrible land of sexual indulgence is so monstrous that the presumption of a
psychopathic state is, under all circumstances, justified." Id. at 611.
w'See td at 427, where he mentions the existence of the 'lust-murder" where
the mere act of killing may yield a sexual satisfaction.
Op. cit. supra, note 23, at 503.
t2 For a general discussion, see GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 343.
Op. cit. supra, note 2, at 56, 57. "
Where a youth, unaccustomed to
liquor and generally of good habits, is persuaded to drink by an older companion.
and, being intoxicated, breaks into a shop and steals cigarettes, the judge will
deal lightly with him."
I Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, House of Lords 19201 A. C.
479, 499 (1920). "
where a specific intent is an essential element in the
offense, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of
forming such an intent should be taken into consideration m order to deternmne
whether he had in fact formed the intent necessary to constitute the particular
crime. If he was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent required
he could not be convicted of a crime which was committed only if the intent
was proved."
IJAcoBY, TiBE UNsouND MiND

AND

i-sE
LAW 288, 289 (1918). "Many of
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mens, an acute condition of mental disturbance characterized by the
existence of delirium and tremors; 56 acute hallucmosis; r chronic alcoholism;58 or alcoholic paranoia. 59 In all of these instances the disorder started with the "first drink" and subsequently grew out of
hand.60 However, as Glueck points out, "Frequently overindulgence
in alcohol is found to be merely a symptom of another psychosis, or
at any rate may be incident to another psychosis, such as general paralysis, manic-depressive insanity, dementia praecox, epilepsy,
etc.""1 But that these various forms of disorder may constitute msanity is without doubt. That they can take the form of irresistible
impulse is well borne out by the following extract concerning a dypsomaniac.

62

William James in Is Psychology reports the case
of a dypsomamac, an inmate of an almshouse m Ohio, who, driven
by the craving for alcohol, deliberately amputated his arm with an
axe and ran into the main hall begging for a bowl of water and some
alcohol. The attendants, who sav the bleeding stump, were horrified
and did as he wished. He immersed the bleeding stump into the
basin of water and alcohol for a moment or two, and with the
uninjured hand raised the bowl, drank the contents of alcohol, blood,
and water in a few gulps, and heaved a sigh of relief."'
the so-called alcoholic crimes, injury to person, homicides and sicides, take place
m the affect of fear that accompames a pathological state of inebriety. To know
this is quite as important for the jurist as it is for the physician."
t'Id. at 289-292. See GLuEcE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 344. See People v.
Toner, 217 Mich. 640, 187 N.W 386 (1922).
' See GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 344. See also JACOBY, op. cit. supra,
note 55, at 293-294. "The psychosis begins and is accompamed by pronounced
affects of fear, during which the patients, tormented by voices, not infrequently
appeal to the police for protection, or even commit sicide." (See MEREDrrH, op.
cit. supra, note 2, at 86, for a discussion of "irresistible impulse to kill oneself.")
JACOB', O. cit. supra, note 55, at 297-299. "In such cases we are dealing
with a dementia, the sufferers from which are no longer to be looked upon and
treated as simple deteriorates, but as insane individuals."
" Id. at 299. "In not a few chronic alcoholics, paranoiac delusions of a more
or less systenuzed nature develop. Most frequent is the delusion of jealousy.
The aversion which the marital consort so often expenences toward the more and
more deteriorating alcoholic, the sexual impotence that follows the long use of
alcohol and the marked enfeeblement of judgment constitute the basis upon
wich the delusions develop.
Gross maltreatment, dangerous physical injury or murder are the resulting offenses." See the discussion of insane delusion,
supra.
SGlueck indicates that the amount of alcohol needed to give rise to the
various conditions vanes with the individual. GLuEcK, op. cit. supra, note 3,
at 343.
, Ibid. "It would appear that the fact of an insane person voluntarily aggravating his mental condition by the use of alcohol does not lessen Ins chances of
successfully pleading insanity." MNEEDrrr, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 59, n. 1,
citing Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860).
1 Glueck defines dypsomamacs as "those who are
at certain penods
seized with the most uncontrollable cravings for alcohol
GLuECcr, op. cit.
supra, note 3, at 344.
13Note N. Y. UNIv. L. REv. 518 (1937).
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The chronic misuse of narcotics, like the chronic misuse of alcohol,
also leads to mental derangement.. 4 In the use of the drug morphine,
the will power becomes markedly affected from the very'begmnmg.
The victims become "
abject slaves and shrink from nothing in
order to satisfy their need. Deception, lies, theft, embezzlement and
forgery are the offenses to which this slavery leads. Among female
drug addicts, prostitution m order to obtain money to purchase morphme is of frequent occurrence." 65 Other narcotics that may lead to
similar mental disorders are cocaine, ether, chloral, chloroform,
hasheesh, opium, and absinthe. 60
Thus medical science has demonstrated that the field of pharmacospychoses embraces mental disorders of a wide variety of types and
conclusively includes the controversial irresistible impulse.

,Since, therefore, irresistible inpulse exists, it becomes the duty
of all courts to recognize it and to set up machinery whereby the
difficulty of proof may be overcome. 67 Further, it would seem advisable to explore the entire field of mental disorder as a criminal defense, to take cognizance of its weaknesses, and to initiate constructive
reforms. It is not suggested that any complete and all-inclusive
solution answering every problem can be forged at the present time.
The field of psychiatry is young and may not yet have scratched the
surface in its examination of the mysteries of the mind. In any event,
it would be beyond the scope of this note to recommend reforms in
more than basic outline form. However, there are several correctable
ills in our present administration of the defense of insanity for which
reasonable solutions can be offered.
One instance of possible reform is "sorting out" defendants previous
to the trial. 68 Usually the issue of insanity is not raised until the trial,
op. cit. supra, note 55, at 301.
lbzd.
' Id. at 804. See also Perkins v. U. S., 288 Fed. 408 (1915) where chloral
hydrate, adminstered by a doctor, caused a stupor during which the patient
gulped the rest of the bottle and, becoming temporarily insane, committed murder;
and Prather v. Comm., 215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W 559 (1926).
Some courts have employed the system of reqiring that more than one
act of irresistible impulse be shown m order to make out the existence of the disorder. State v. Harrison, 86 W Va. 729, 751-752, 15 S.E. 982, 989-990 (1892).
"'It is rare to see true cases of mental disorder where a crime has been the first
evidence of it. In every practically every bona fide case there is a history pointing
definitely to mental disturbance over a considerable period of time previous to
the criminal act. " Henderson, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 4 PsYcinA-uc
QUAnTEnLY 108, 104-105 (1930), as cited, HALL, GENERAL PRiNcIPLES OF CmnriNAL LA v 525, n. 59 (1947).
"JACOBY,

' See

WEmoFEN,

op. cit. supra, note 14, at 899 et. seq.

"

examinations

made just after conviction are apt to be most misleading.
It is of the first
importance that mental examination should be made before trial and sentence."
Id. at 428, citing SArH, Tni PsYcnoLoGY OF TnE CBmNAL 168.
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and only then when interposed by the accused as a defense. 9 Under
such a system, even where the issue is raised, the insane are obliged
to suffer a long and arduous trial. If the issue is not raised, they may
suffer imprisonment and subsequent transfer to the asylum. 70 Moreover, in such crimes as rape, burglary, and habitual larceny where
insanity is seldom made an issue, mentally diseased individuals complete their sentences or are released on parole only to commit further
offenses. 7' The most important stride in the direction of solving this
problem has been made in Massachusetts with the passage of the
"Briggs Law."72 Under this act, all persons indicted for a capital
offense, or for any offense where more than one previous indictment
or a previous conviction of a felony exists, are subjected to a mental
examination by the state department of mental diseases. Several objections have been raised to this system, some valid, some invalid.73
Such complaints as poor administration m providing information of
past indictments and that examinations are frequently given on too
short notice could be corrected by more able administration. The
argument that the statute includes only certain types of offenders
probably indicates a valid weakness but one which is correctable by
merely expanding the provisions to include a wider group of offenders.

Perhaps the great sociological and legal advantages would outweigh
the expense of examining every person indicted for crime.
The Massachusetts Department of Mental Diseases makes the
examination.7 4 It is not connected with the court but is a separate
governmental agency, part of the function of which is to examine the
defendants and advise the court concerning the mental condition
NVEmoEN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 399.
op. cit. supra, note 14, at 399. See also

N
WEMOFEN,

INSANiTY 245, 248 (1924),
'Note 38 YALE L. J.

as cited in

WEHOFEN,

SULLAVAN,

supra, at 400.

CaImE

AND

368 at 375 (1929). See Bowers, The Necessity for
Medical Examinations of Prisoners at the Time of Trial, 24 CAsE AND Com. 82
(1918), as cited m 38 YALE L. J. at 373, n. 20. "Ina recent study that I made
of 100 recidivists each of whom had been convicted not less than four times, 12
of them were insane, 23 were feebleminded, 10 were epileptic and in each mstance the mental defectiveness bore a direct casual relation to their crimes. No
less than 180 trials have been held for these persons."
See WEIXOFEN, op. cit.
M-'MAss.
GEN. LAWS C. 123, see. 1000 A (1932).
supra, note 14, at 401. Note 38 YALE L. J. 368, 375 (1929). "The Massachusetts law recognizes the fact that a man may be of dangerously unsound mind
without being legally insane." Id. at 373. See Psychopathology and its Influence
on the Administration of Criminal Law, 92 CENrt. L. J.443, 444 (1921).
3

WEHMOFEN,

op. cit. supra, note 14, at 405-406. It has been suggested that

psycuatnsts would find something mentally wrong with everyone examined but
this seems to be ably refuted by statistics revealing that only 21% of the cases
examined m Massachusetts were found either insane or mentally deficient. Overholser, Psychiatnj and the Courts in Massachusetts, 19 J.Cmf.L. 75 at 82 (1928).
Note, 38 YA.E L. J. 368, 374 (1929).
7'NVmorEN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 401.
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thereof. 75 The findings of this group are not conclusive upon the
courts. The prosecuting attorney, however, usually drops the charges
against an insane defendant or the jury, while allowed to hear experts to the contrary, are generally very much swayed by the Depart-

ment's finding that the accused is sane.76 Such a system of examination serves a valuable purpose and, with modification, should be a

77
universal part of the administration of insanity as a criminal defense.
Of course, the ultimate decision must rest with the jury, inasmuch
as any other approach would run into the various problems of constitutionality 78 The defendant has a right to a trial by jury to pass on
one of the necessary elements of a crime, the presence of criminal
intent (mens rea). 79 Therefore, the question arises as to how best to
present the question of insanity to the jury for purposes of determining the existence of such "intent." There are two prospective avenues
of reform: (1) revise the legal test of insanity and (2) overhaul the
present system of expert testimony
The McNaughton test of "right and wrong" has already been
described as insufficient in the light of modern psychiatric principles.8 0
The unsatisfactory handling of insane delusion and the failure to recog-

'Note
38 YALE L. J. 368, 372 (1929). The argument might be raised that
such an administrative department would become political and subject to partisan
policies, but this seems no more important than the criticism that all judges are
either politically elected or are appointed by men holding political office.
" Id. at 372-373. "When the report of the board finds the defendant sane
his counsel may nevertheless wish to pursue this line of defense by calling in his
own experts. Since the Briggs Law has been in operation, less than one case in
a year of this sort has been reported."
'See Jacoby, The Psychopathic Clinic in a Criminal Court: Its Uses and
Possibilities, 7 Joxm. OF A En. JuDic. Soc. 21 (1923). According to WEMOFEN,
op. cit. supra, note 14, at 400, "Psychiatric clinics or laboratories are now in operation in connection with the mumcipal courts of Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and
other cities." See the discussion of the psychopathic clime set up m connection
with the mumcipal courts of Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and other cities." See the
discussion of the psychopathic climc set up in connection with the police department in New York m the Report of the Committee, Psychopathic Laboratory,
Police Department, City of New York (1917), quoted by GLUECK, op. cit. supra,
note 3, at 473. He suggests that the climc should be attached to the court rather
than the police. See also Larson and Walker, Paranoiaand Paranoid Personalities: A PracticalPolice Problem, 14 J. Cium. L. 350 (1923).
" See supra, note 21, where it is pointed out that either taking the determination of insanity away from the jury or replacing the lay panel with a panel of
experts is constitutionally objectionable. In addition, the defense of insanity
itself may not be abolished for similar reasons. Note 20 YALE L. J. 313 (1911).
7 WEIuoFEN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 427. See Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 2 J. Cami. L. 521, 528 (1911).
'"Psychiatrists, for example, are convinced that a crme may be the result
of mental disease and yet the criminal's faculties of reason, Ins power to premeditate and to scheme may be unimpaired, and indeed in many cases strengthened, by his mental condition. Legally, however, unless his powers to distingmsh
right from wrong, and his ability to comprehend the nature and consequences of
his act are impaired, he is not immune from punishment." Note 38 YALE L. J.
868, 375 (1929).
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nize irresistible impulse in the majority of jurisdictions l have already
been indicated as suggestive of reform. In addition, most jurisdictions
completely fail to make allowance for degrees of responsibility wherem certain types of insanity will reduce the grade of the offense without excusing it entirely 8 2 Yet there is powerful legal and medical
3
support for such a doctrine8
Perhaps New Hampshire has set the proper trend in entirely abol84
ishing the legal test for insanity and making it a jury question. Under such a system the entire knowledge of psychiatry as to insane
delusion, irresistible impulse, sexual deviations of all types, pharmacopysychoses, partial insanity, and all other fields of mental disorder
could be readily employed m reaching the verdict. Such an approach
would seem reasonable when combined with a system whereby a
state mental department would pass on the sanity of persons indicted
for crime and would make specific findings of complete sanity, complete insanity, or mental aberrations affecting the degree of crime.
The findings would be introduced m evidence before the jury along
with the testimony of such other experts as the parties might decide
to call.
The term experts suggests a further but related aspect of reform.
Under the present system, any reputable physician is legally qualified
to speak as an expert on insanity, even though he may never have had
any instruction or expenence m mental disorders.8 This leads to un"'See supra, note 35.
"See Weihofen s study of the tests employed by the various jurisdictions and
the almost complete absence of the doctrine of degrees of responsibility (insanity
reducing the grade of the offense), WEmOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 109
et. seq. A typical statement is found in State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291
Pac. 1093, 1096 (1930). "There is no degree of mental irresponsibility which
would render a defendant incapable of premeditated murder, and so reduce the
cnme to murder in the second degree."
See Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting Degree of Crime.
56 YALE L. J. 959 (1944); Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of
Crime, 34 CAL. L. R. 625 (1946). KnAFF-r-EBING, op. cit. supra, note 23, at 503,
suggests mitigation of the offense in certain sex crimes. "[It] exerts an influence
on the motive of the incmrmnating act; and a just judge, notwithstanding the lack
of legal irresponsibility due to mental defect or disease, will recognize the circumstances which ameliorate the heinousness of the crime."
See Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W 2d 993, 996 (1930). "The mmd
of one laboring under insane delusion is incapable of reason and reflection necessary to the exmstence of malice, without which murder may not exist." See the
dissent in Fisher v. U. S., 328 U. S. 463. According to WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra,
note 14 ,at 109 et. seq., the following jurisdictions have either directly or by nnplication ado pted degrees of responsibility in some form: Connecticut, Illinois,
Ohio, Pennsylvama, Tennessee, Utah, Virgima, and Wisconsm.
' The basic mquiry is whether the defendant had a mental disorder and,
if so, is it of such a character or so far developed as to take away capacity to
form or entertain the criminal intent. See State v. Pike, 39 N. H. 399 (1869);
State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871). See WfImoFEN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at

79 et. seq.

'WEmoFEN,

op. cit. supra, note 14, at 418.
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reliability 6 and partiality 8 7 This particular problem could be met
by the establishment of a uniform standard for experts. Set qualifications exist for admission to practice as a doctor or as a specialist, so
why not provide a test to determine the necessary qualifications of
psychiatrists for purposes of testimony in cases involving insanity?
This precaution coupled with the great weight the jury is likely to
give the findings of the state mental department, should offer a logical
solution to the expert problem. Thus the qualified psychiatrists, no
longer shackled by the archaic McNaughton test, could be of great
aid to the courts m reaching just results where msanity is a defense m
criminal cases.
To complete the picture, it is proposed that the judge may consult
with the experts of the state mental department concerning the passing
of sentence following the verdict of the jury8
ROBERT HALL SmiTH

IMPLIED EASEMENTS OF NECESSITY CONTRASTED
WITH THOSE BASED ON QUASI-EASEMENTS
Easements may be classified according to their method of creation
as prescriptive, express and implied. Implied easements include the
easement of necessity and the easement implied from a quasi-easement. These two types are similar and for either to arise, the title
to the land must have been in a common owner and he must have conveyed a part of the land by deed in such a way as to create a need
for an easement to benefit the land conveyed or the land retained.
Also, both types are based fundamentally on implied intention as
determined from a construction of the deed. In spite of their similarity, however, implied easements of necessity and implied easements
based on quasi-easements are clearly distinguishable, both as to the
nature of the implication underlying each and as to the circumstance
surrounding the execution of the deed which supports the implication.
This essential distinction is of considerable practical importance in
Ibzd.

White, INSAmTY AND TnE CnnNutNA LAw 56-57 (1923).
s Such a provision would be constitutional under Williams v. New York 337
U. S. 241, 246 (1949). "But both before and since the American colomes became

a nation, courts in tlis country and in England practiced a policy under which
a sentencingjudge could exercise a wide discretion m the sources and types of
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of pumshment to
be unposed within limits fixed by the law."

